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Perfect Secrecy in Physical Layer Network Coding
Systems from Structured Interference
David A. Karpuk, Member, IEEE, Arsenia Chorti, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Physical layer network coding (PNC) has been
proposed for next generation networks. In this contribution,
we investigate PNC schemes with embedded perfect secrecy by
exploiting structured interference in relay networks with two
users and a single relay. In a practical scenario where both users
employ finite and uniform signal input distributions we propose
upper bounds (UBs) on the achievable perfect secrecy rates
and make these explicit when PAM modems are used. We then
describe two simple, explicit encoders that can achieve perfect
secrecy rates close to these UBs with respect to an untrustworthy
relay in the single antenna and single relay setting. Lastly, we
generalize our system to a MIMO relay channel where the relay
has more antennas than the users and optimal precoding matrices
which maintain a required secrecy constraint are studied. Our
results establish that the design of PNC transmission schemes
with enhanced throughput and guaranteed data confidentiality
is feasible in next generation systems.
Index Terms—Physical layer network coding, achievable se-
crecy rate, perfect secrecy, signal space alignment
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the ideas of network coding [1] have been ex-
tended to the wireless physical medium; notably, in [2],
[3], among others, the concept of harnessing interference
through structured codes was explored in the framework of
physical layer network coding (PNC). These technologies can
be proven instrumental in enabling the envisaged multi-fold
increase in data throughput in fifth generation (5G) networks
[4]. The generic PNC system model with two independent
sources and one relay is depicted in Fig. 1 and assumes that
communication is executed in two cycles. In the first cycle,
the nodes A, referred to as Alice, and B, referred to as Bob,
transmit simultaneously respective codewords to the relay node
R, referred to as Ray. In the second cycle, Ray, broadcasts to
Alice and Bob a function of the total received signal; Alice and
Bob then retrieve each’s other messages by canceling off their
corresponding transmissions. Depending on the transformation
executed by Ray, one of the following relaying strategies
can be employed: amplify and forward, decode and forward,
compress and forward [5], or the recently introduced compute
and forward [6] approach.
Nevertheless, despite the potential for substantial increase of
the transmission rates in wireless networks, a major obstacle in
the widespread deployment of PNC and generally of relay net-
works arises due to security concerns, i.e., the confidentiality
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Fig. 1. Physical layer network coding (PNC) with two transmitter and one
relay node.
of the exchanged data with respect to an untrustworthy relay.
A straightforward approach would be employing encryption
at upper layers of the communication network or encryption
at the physical layer [7]. However, the management of secret
keys used by the crypto algorithms depends on the structure
of the access network and already fourth generation systems
(4G) have a key hierarchy of height five (5) for each individual
end-user, while there exist multiple keys in each layer of
the hierarchy [8]. Extrapolating from the experience of 4G
systems, it is expected that the management of secret keys
in 5G would become an even more complicated task [9]. The
generation, the management and the distribution of secret keys
in decentralized settings, such as device-to-device PNC net-
works, without an infrastructure that supports key management
and authentication will impose new security challenges.
An alternative theoretical framework for the study of data
confidentiality in the physical layer of wireless networks,
dubbed as physical layer security [10]–[12], has recently be-
come a focal point of research in the wireless community. The
metric of interest, referred to as the channel secrecy capacity
is the supremum of transmission rates at which data can be
exchanged reliably while satisfying a weak secrecy [13], [14],
a strong secrecy [15] or a perfect secrecy constraint [16]. As
an example, let Xn be the n-length encoded version of a nR-
bit message transmitted by the source and let Zn denote the
passive eavesdropper’s information. Weak and strong secrecy
assume that the code’s blocklength n becomes arbitrarily long,
while Shannon’s definition of perfect secrecy in [16] on the
other hand explicitly assumes a finite blocklength, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Zn) = 0, weak secrecy constraint, (1)
lim
n→∞
I(Xn;Zn) = 0, strong secrecy constraint, (2)
I(X ;Z) = 0, perfect secrecy constraint. (3)
The first study of weak secrecy in relay channels with
confidential messages has appeared in [17] while further
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Fig. 2. Nested encoder for strong secrecy in PNC systems: Alice encodes the secret messages using an inner encoder θA for reliability and an outer encoder
ϕA for secrecy. On the other hand, Bob employs the corresponding decoders φB and ϑB to obtain an estimate of the secret messages transmitted by Alice.
analyses followed [18], [19]; these contributions established
that the secrecy capacity of one-way relay channels is zero,
unless the source-destination channel is better than the source-
relay channel. In essence, relay topologies of practical interest
in which the link to the relay is better than the direct link
were shown to be inherently insecure. Due to this limiting
result, subsequent work focused entirely on cooperative relay
channels with trustworthy relays, [20]–[23] to cite but a few.
However, unlike one-way relay networks, systems employ-
ing network coding can on the other hand benefit from the
simultaneity of transmissions to an untrustworthy relay to
achieve data confidentiality as noted in [24]. In essence, the
structured interference observed by the relay can be exploited
to achieve strong secrecy in the wireless transmissions [25],
[26]. In [27]–[29] the role of interference in achieving strong
secrecy was demonstrated using lattice encoders; in these
works the superposition of the interference to the data was
viewed as a modulo addition operation, i.e., the superposition
was assumed to take place in the code space and not in the
signal space.
In the present study, PNC networks in which Ray can
observe superpositions in the signal space (real sums of signals
transmitted by Alice and Bob as opposed to modulo sums in
the code space) are investigated in the presence of synchro-
nization errors assuming all nodes employ M -ary pulse ampli-
tude modulation (M -PAM) transceivers; this realistic scenario
is fundamentally more demanding than previously investigated
settings [23]. To separate the problem of secrecy from error
correction, we first restrict to a noiseless channel where we
evaluate upper bounds (UBs) on the achievable perfect secrecy
rates, make these explicit in the case of PAM modems, and
investigate the effect of synchronization errors on secrecy. The
proposed secret encoders in the single input single output
(SISO) setting are constructive examples of coset coding
that allow Ray to obtain estimates of linear combinations
of the transmitted PAM symbols but not to retrieve any of
the secret bits they carry, thus achieving perfect secrecy,
i.e., zero information leakage per PAM symbol. Finally, our
system model is extended to the multiple input multiple output
(MIMO) case in which we study optimal precoding matrices
which achieve the required signal alignment at the relay,
while preserving secrecy. Our study differs from earlier work
on interference alignment for secrecy [30], [31], [32] and
interference alignment for the MIMO channel [33] in that the
required secrecy conditions demand equality of matrices rather
than just of the subspaces generated by their columns.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the SISO
system model is presented. In Section III we propose upper
bounds (UBs) on the achievable perfect secrecy rates of
the noiseless SISO system given finite constellations, pro-
vide explicit formulas for these bounds in the case of PAM
modems, and further discuss the impact of synchronization
errors on the upper bounds. In Section IV two explicit encoders
achieving perfect secrecy are constructed, the first assuming
no cooperation between the users, and the second assuming
that the user of the smaller constellation has some non-trivial
information about the signal transmitted by the other user.
Both approaches are shown to be close to the relevant upper
bounds. In Section V we generalize our setup to a noisy
MIMO channel in which the users and the relay have multiple
antennas, and study optimal precoding matrices. Finally in
Section VI the conclusions of this contribution are drawn and
future directions of the work are discussed.
II. SECURE PNC SYSTEM MODEL
Communication between Alice and Bob with the help of
Ray takes place into two cycles as depicted in Fig. 1. In
what follows, we use the subscript A to denote quantities
and variables (source symbols, codewords, etc.) corresponding
to Alice and the subscript B for those belonging to Bob.
All channel coefficients and encoding/decoding algorithms are
public, i.e., known by Alice, Bob, and Ray. The notation
xn denotes the sequence [x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)] while lower
case letters denote realizations of respective random variables
that are represented with the corresponding upper case letters,
e.g., x denotes a realization of the random variable X with
probability mass function (pmf) pX(x).
We assume that Alice’s and Bob’s source symbols (se-
cret messages) are drawn from discrete alphabets. Under
an average power constraint, the use of Gaussian encoders
has been demonstrated to achieve the secrecy capacity of
the interference channel [34]. However when transmission is
constrained by a joint amplitude-variance constraint1 it has
been shown that the capacity is on the contrary achieved by
employing codebooks of finite size; a recent extension of these
1Under this realistic assumption the amplitude of the transmitted signals is
bounded, as in all actual communication systems.
3results in the wiretap channel has shown that this holds true
for the secrecy capacity as well [35]. Due to this reason, in the
following we exclusively operate under the assumption that all
codebooks have finite size.
We start by examining the scenario in which all nodes have
single antennas while the multi-antenna case will be covered
in a later section. In the present work we treat separately the
design of secrecy encoders from error correction encoding; this
can be straightforwardly achieved with the nested structure
depicted in Fig. 2 including an inner encoder for reliability
and an outer encoder for secrecy. The reason we propose this
approach is that, contrary to error correction, in the noiseless
PNC setting it is possible to achieve perfect secrecy without
introducing any delay, i.e., secrecy is achieved on a per symbol
basis and does not rely on the existence of noise to increase
the equivocation at Ray but rather on structured interference.
In the presentation of the proposed nested encoder we
employ the following notation: Alice (respectively Bob) em-
ploys a rate q
n
, q, n ∈ N, q ≤ n inner encoder for reliability
denoted by θA (respectively θB) and corresponding decoder
denoted by ϑB (respectively ϑA). Furthermore, to ensure
perfect secrecy Alice (Bob) uses a unit symbol rate outer
secrecy encoder denoted by ϕA (respectively ϕB) with a
corresponding decoder φB (respectively φA). On the other
hand Ray employs a PNC wrapping function (e.g., “compress
and forward”) denoted by f . In subsections II-A to II-C we
explain the above setting in further detail and discuss the
necessary secrecy conditions.
A. First transmission cycle
Inner encoder for reliability: In the first cycle Alice maps
length-q sequences of secret messages sA ∈ SA, selected
uniformly at random from the set SA of secret messages
to length-n codewords. To this end, Alice first employs an
encoder θA : SqA → UnA, θA(sqA) = unA. Similarly Bob maps
length-q sequences of secret messages sB ∈ SB using an
encoder θB : SqB → UnB , θB(sqB) = unB .
Outer encoder for perfect secrecy: Alice and Bob encode
the sequences unA and unB respectively to codewords xnA and
xnB element by element using corresponding encoders ϕA :
UA → XA and ϕB : UB → XB with ϕA(uA) = xA and
ϕB(uB) = xB . We define MA and MB to be the sizes of the
codebooks XA and XB , denoted by |XA| = MA and |XB | =
MB . We set mA = log2MA and mB = log2MB .
Ray’s observation (assuming perfect synchronization at
Alice and Bob) can be expressed as
y = hAxA + hBxB + wR = xR + wR, (4)
where hA (respectively hB) is the channel (fading) coefficient
in the link from Alice (Bob) to Ray, xR = hAxA+hBxB , and
wR is the noise at Ray, modeled as (a realization of) a zero-
mean circularly symmetric Gaussian complex random variable
with variance σ2R.
B. Second transmission cycle
PNC wrapping: In the second cycle of the communication,
Ray performs a wrapping of the received PNC observation y
to compressed PNC observations using a mapping f : Y →
Z , where f(y) = z (e.g., possible options for this mapping
include “compress and forward” and “compute and forward”).
We assume that f is invertible given either xA or xB , that
is, that Alice can recover y from z given that she knows xA,
and similarly for Bob. An obvious choice is to select Z = Y
and have f be the identity function, i.e., Ray forwards exactly
what he receives.
Finally, Ray transmits z to Alice and Bob, who then observe
yA = h˜Az + wA, (5)
yB = h˜Bz + wB , (6)
where h˜A (respectively h˜B) is the channel (fading) coefficient
from Ray to Alice (Ray to Bob), and wA (wB) is the noise
at Alice (Bob), modeled as a circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variable with variance σ2A (σ2B).
Alice uses a decoder φA : YA → UB , to produce esti-
mates φA(yA) = uˆB of Bob’s transmitted secret codewords.
Respectively, Bob uses a function φB : YB → UA, to
produce estimates φB(yB) = uˆA of Alice’s transmitted secret
codewords.
For the purposes of error correction Alice (Bob) employs a
decoding function ϑA : UnB → SqB with ϑA(uˆnB) = sˆqB (ϑB :
UnA → SqA with ϑB(uˆnA) = sˆqA). Focusing exclusively on the
secrecy of the PNC scheme, we assume that limn→∞ Pne,A =
0 (limn→∞ Pne,B = 0) where the probability of a decoding
error at Alice (respectively Bob) is Pne,A = Pr[ϑA(uˆnB) 6= sqB]
(respectively (Pne,B = Pr[ϑB(uˆnA) 6= sqA]).
C. Perfect Secrecy and an Upper Bound on the Achievable
Secrecy Rates
Perfect secrecy can be achieved with respect to Ray if the
mutual information between Ray’s observation and the secret
source symbols is zero, i.e.,
I(Y ;SA) = 0, perfect secrecy condition for Alice (7)
I(Y ;SB) = 0, perfect secrecy condition for Bob. (8)
The input and output random variables in the PNC system
model form respective Markov chains SqA → UnA → XnA →
XnR → Y n and SqB → UnB → XnB → XnR → Y n. As a result,
due to the data processing inequality, to satisfy conditions (7)
and (8) it suffices to show that
I(XR;SA) = 0, sufficient condition for (7), (9)
I(XR;SB) = 0, sufficient condition for (8). (10)
For fixed input distributions, encoders, and channels, we
will study the perfect secrecy rates2 RsA and RsB provided
(9) and (10) are satisfied. To measure the optimality of our
encoding schemes, we will compare them with the following
upper bounds (UBs) on the achievable perfect secrecy rates:
RsA ≤ R̂sA = [I(YB ;XA|XB)− I(Y ;XA)]+ , (11)
RsB ≤ R̂sB = [I(YA;XB|XA)− I(Y ;XB)]+ . (12)
2As the messages are delivered over two transmission cycles, one should
potentially multiply all upper bounds and rates by 1
2
; however we omit this
factor for clarity and as it does not affect the nature of our results.
4In the following section we investigate R̂sA and R̂sB further
for noiseless channels. In [14] it was only shown that (11)
and (12) are achievable for weak secrecy as in (1). As we
consider only perfect secrecy, the above serve only as upper
bounds. However, their intuitive and easily-computable nature
yields them useful nonetheless.
III. UPPER BOUNDS IN THE NOISELESS SCENARIO
Throughout this section and the next we assume that
(i) the pmfs of XA and XB are uniform, and
(ii) all channels are fixed and invertible.
When channel state information is globally available, we
assume that Alice and Bob employ channel precoders, denoted
respectively by gA and gB, such that
hAgA = hBgB (13)
so that Ray observes
y = hAgAxA+hBgBxB+wR = hAgA(xA+xB)+wR. (14)
Ray now attempts to recover the sum xA + xB . The secrecy
of our proposed encoders depends only on the structure of the
sum xA + xB , so we set wR = 0 in the next two sections. In
this noiseless environment, Ray can post-multiply the received
signal in (14) by (hAgA)−1 to recover xA + xB exactly.
Similarly, the Ray-Alice and Ray-Bob channels are assumed
noiseless. We summarize by adding a third assumption:
(iii) All channel gains are equal to unity and all noise sources
are zero, that is, hA = hB = h˜A = h˜B = 1 and wA =
wB = wR = 0.
While this may seem unrealistic, we are rather interested in the
achievable perfect secrecy rates based solely on the structure
of the sum xA + xB itself. Thus while the presence of noise
and channel gains can have a deteriorating effect on Alice
and Bob’s overall data rate, removing assumption (iii) will
not affect perfect secrecy relative to Ray, nor will it affect the
perfect secrecy rate relative to the overall data rate.
We note that although channel inversion is impractical in
Rayleigh environments, it can be employed whenever a line
of sight (LOS) exists between either transmitter and Ray,
i.e., whenever a Rician, a Nakagami-m or other large scale
fading channel model [36] is applicable. We will return to
the question of designing optimal precoders gA and gB in the
presence of noise in Section V.
A. An Upper Bound on the Achievable Perfect Secrecy Rate
In the noiseless setting with unit channel gains, the set of
all possible observations at Ray is
Y = XR = {xA + xB | xA ∈ XA, xB ∈ XB} (15)
which comes with an addition function
ψ : XA ×XB → Y, ψ(xA, xB) = xA + xB. (16)
Crucial to our analysis are the sets
ψ−1(y) = {(xA, xB) | y = xA + xB}. (17)
The pmf of Y is given by the convolution of the pmfs of XA
and XB , which is clearly seen to be
pY (y) =
∑
xA,xB
xA+xB=y
pXA(xA)pXB (xB) =
|ψ−1(y)|
MAMB
. (18)
The following proposition gives a compact, intuitive upper
bound on the achievable secrecy rates R̂sA and R̂sB .
Proposition 1: In the noiseless scenario R̂sA and R̂sB are
equal. Furthermore, denoting R̂s = R̂sA = R̂sB , we have
R̂s =
∑
y∈Y
log2 |ψ−1(y)|
|ψ−1(y)|
MAMB
(19)
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the noiseless scenario we therefore simply define R̂s to
be the perfect secrecy rate UB. Intuitively, for a given y ∈ Y ,
log2 |ψ−1(y)| measures equivocation at Ray in bits, and should
therefore upper bound the total number of secret bits that Alice
and Bob can transmit when Ray observes y while maintaining
perfect secrecy. The quantity |ψ−1(y)|/MAMB = pY (y)
measures the frequency at which Ray observes y, properly
weighting the sum as a rate calculation would. However, note
that to fully exploit the value of |ψ−1(y)|, Alice and Bob
would need to know this number, and hence need non-trivial
knowledge of each other’s symbols, in advance.
B. Guaranteed Entropy
In this subsection, we establish upper bounds on the achiev-
able secrecy rates in the scenario in which Alice and Bob have
no knowledge of the other’s symbols. For such a scenario,
these upper bounds are necessarily tighter than the above R̂s.
First, we define for any symbols xA and xB a useful notion
of the amount of confusion Ray is guaranteed to experience
when transmitting one of these points.
Definition 1: For any xA ∈ XA we define the guaranteed
entropy of xA to be
s(xA) = min
xB∈XB
log2 |ψ−1(xA + xB)|. (20)
and similarly for any xB ∈ XB we define
s(xB) = min
xA∈XA
log2 |ψ−1(xA + xB)|. (21)
The following proposition is more or less immediate.
Proposition 2: In the noiseless scenario with unit channel
gains where Alice has no knowledge of xB and Bob has
no knowledge of xA, the achievable secrecy rates are upper
bounded by RsA ≤ R˜sA and RsB ≤ R˜sB where
R˜sA =
∑
xA∈XA
s(xA)
MA
, R˜sB =
∑
xB∈XB
s(xB)
MB
(22)
Proof: Suppose that a secret message sA of length l(sA)
is encoded in xA, so that log2 l(sA) measures the amount of
information in sA in bits. For any xB , Ray can determine
mA − log2 |ψ−1(xA + xB)| of the total number mA of
bits transmitted by Alice. As Alice has no knowledge of
xB , the value of l(xA) must be independent of xB , and it
follows that maintaining perfect secrecy requires log2 l(sA) ≤
5Value of y = xA + xB
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Fig. 3. The pmf of Ray’s observation y = xA+xB in the noiseless scenario
with channel gains hA = hB = 1. Here Alice employs a 4-PAM modulator
and Bob a 16-PAM modulator.
log2 |ψ−1(xA + xB)| for all xB . Hence log2 l(xA) ≤ s(xA),
from which it follows that
RsA ≤
∑
xA∈XA
log2 l(sA) · pXA(xA) ≤
∑
xA∈XA
s(xA)
MA
(23)
as claimed. Identical reasoning applies to Bob.
Note that the above upper bounds R˜sA and R˜sB hold re-
gardless of the nature of the input distributions SA and SB;
that is, they apply to non-binary and non-uniform secret input
distributions alike. Similarly, they hold regardless of whether
one chooses to code over several time instances.
C. Upper Bounds on the Achievable Perfect Secrecy Rates for
PAM Modems
Let us now study a familiar scenario in which XA and XB
are, respectively, MA- and MB-PAM constellations, so that
XA is the uniform distribution on
XA = {−(MA−1),−(MA−3), . . . ,MA−3,MA−1} (24)
and similarly for XB . Throughout this section we assume that
MB ≥ 2MA. The theorems of this subsection evaluate the
upper bounds of the previous subsection for PAM modems.
Proposition 3: In the noiseless setting with unit channel
gains when Alice and Bob employ MA-PAM and MB-PAM
modulators with MB ≥ 2MA, we have
|ψ−1(y)| =

0 y odd or |y| ≥MB +MA,
MB+MA−|y|
2 MB −MA + 2 ≤ |y| ≤MB +MA − 2,
MA |y| ≤MB −MA.
Proof: This is a straightforward calculation and is there-
fore omitted.
The above proposition in conjunction with (18) allows us
to explicitly describe the Ray’s pmf pY (y). In Fig. 3 we plot
the values of |ψ−1(y)| for MA = 4 and MB = 16. In the
following sections we will exploit the trapezoidal nature of
Ray’s pmf when constructing explicit encoding functions.
Theorem 1: In the noiseless setting with unit channel
gains when Alice and Bob employ MA-PAM and MB-PAM
modulators with MB ≥ 2MA, we have
R̂s = mA
MB −MA + 1
MB
+
MA−1∑
a=1
log2(a)
2a
MAMB
. (25)
In particular, for fixed MA we have limMB→∞ R̂s = mA.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The follow proposition explicitly computes s(xA) and
s(xB), which immediately results in explicit expressions for
R˜sA and R˜sB of Section III-B which do not assume cooperation
between Alice and Bob.
Proposition 4: In the noiseless setting with unit channel
gains when Alice and Bob employ MA-PAM and MB-PAM
modulators with MB ≥ 2MA, the guaranteed entropies of xA
and xB are given by
s(xA) = log2
Å
MA + 1− |xA|
2
ã
(26)
s(xB) =
®
mA |xB| ≤MB − 2MA + 1
log2
Ä
MB+1−|xB|
2
ä
otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix C.
D. Effect of Time Synchronization Errors on the Upper Bounds
One of the main issues in PNC networks is that the assump-
tion of perfect time synchronization is too optimistic. In this
subsection we investigate the effect of time synchronization on
R̂s when Alice and Bob employ M -PAM modulators. In this
case the analog signals transmitted by Alice and Bob, denoted
by tA(t), and tB(t) respectively, can be expressed as:
tA(t) =
∞∑
l=−∞
xA(l) cos(2pift)g(t− lT − δTA), (27)
tB(t) =
∞∑
l=−∞
xB(l) cos(2pift)g(t− lT − δTB), (28)
where T is the symbol period, δTA and δTB denote the
synchronization errors at Alice and Bob respectively and are
assumed to be uniformly distributed in the range [0, T ] and
g(t) denotes the transmitter filter (commonly implemented
as a raised cosine filter). Here for simplicity we assume
that the transmitter filter is a simple rectangular window of
length equal to the symbol period T . Neglecting all other
noise sources and assuming that Ray employs a matched filter
receiver implemented as a standard correlator receiver, Ray’s
observation y(l) during the l-th symbol can be expressed as
y(l) =
2
T
∫ 0
−δTA
xA(l − 1) cos2(2pift)dt
+
2
T
∫ T−δTA
0
xA(l) cos
2(2pift)dt
+
2
T
∫ 0
−δTB
xB(l − 1) cos2(2pift)dt
+
2
T
∫ T−δTB
0
xB(l) cos
2(2pift)dt
= (1− α)xA + (1− β)xB + αxA(l − 1)
+ βxB(l − 1), (29)
60
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Fig. 4. Numerical evaluation of the UB R̂s in the presence of time
synchronization errors denoted by δTA and δTB . The symbol period is
normalized to unity T = 1.
where
α =
sin
(
4pi δTA
T
)
4pi
+
δTA
T
, (30)
β =
sin
(
4pi δTB
T
)
4pi
+
δTB
T
. (31)
As a result of time synchronization errors, Alice’s and Bob’s
symbols are misaligned when reaching Ray. We investigate the
effect of this misalignment on the UBs by numerically evaluat-
ing (11) and (12). The results are depicted results in Fig. 4; for
relatively small synchronization errors δTA, δTB < 0.25T , the
effect on R̂s is negligible. On the other hand, as the synchro-
nization errors increase their impact on the UBs becomes
increasingly important. Interestingly, due to the sinusoidal
parts of α and β, there are four regions of values of (δTA, δTB)
– around the points
(
1
4 ,
1
4
)
,
(
1
4 ,
3
4
)
,
(
3
4 ,
1
4
)
and
(
3
4 ,
3
4
)
– in
which the decrease in R̂s is more acute.
IV. EXPLICIT ENCODER CONSTRUCTION WITH PAM
MODEMS IN THE NOISELESS SCENARIO
Throughout this section we assume that Alice and Bob use
PAM modems with sizes MA and MB, respectively, satisfying
MB ≥ 2MA. We retain the assumptions of the previous
section, namely that all channels are noiseless and all channel
gains are set to unity.
The central idea behind the proposed approach in designing
the secrecy encoders ϕA and ϕB stems from the following
observation. The superposition of two PAM signals is equiv-
alent to the convolution of two uniform pmfs; the resulting
pmf contains a “flat” region in which Ray’s observations are
equiprobable and two “linear” regions in which combinations
of symbols occur with increasing/decreasing probabilities, as
demonstrated in Fig. 3 for MA = 4 and MB = 16.
In this section we construct explicit secret bit encoders
at both Bob and Alice, compute the corresponding perfect
secrecy rates, and compare the results to the relevant upper
bounds of the previous section. The first subsection is devoted
to the situation wherein neither Alice nor Bob has any infor-
mation about the other’s transmitted signal; thus comparison
of the obtained secrecy rates with the upper bounds R˜sA and
R˜sB is appropriate. The scheme is shown to perform close to
these upper bounds, but Alice’s rate is somewhat deficient in
an absolute sense, in that as MA → ∞, it leaves a constant
gap to the optimal asymptotic behavior of mA bits/sec/Hz.
To increase Alice’s secrecy rate, in the second subsection
we study her achievable secrecy rate when she has knowledge
of ⌊s(xB)⌋ (where ⌊·⌋ denotes the floor function) prior to the
transmission of this symbol by Bob. We construct a simple
scheme which rectifies the deficient asymptotic performance
of the scheme of the previous subsections.
A. Explicit Encoder Construction
This subsection presents an encoding scheme for both Alice
and Bob which does not depend on either user having any
knowledge of the other’s symbols, i.e. no cooperation is
necessary between Alice and Bob. For simplicity we only
describe Bob’s encoding function; obvious remarks apply to
Alice throughout. We construct our encoding function by
first describing a bit labeling procedure on each of Bob’s
constellation points. We then declare certain bits of xB to
be secret and the rest to be public, depending essentially on
the value of s(xB), which in turn effectively determines the
encoding procedure.
We begin by defining subsets X (k)A and X (k)B of Alice
and Bob’s constellations, respectively, for each index k =
0, . . . ,mA, whose usefulness is made clear by the subsequent
proposition. Recall that MB ≥ 2MA.
For Alice’s constellation, we set
X (0)A = {xA | MA − 5 < |xA| ≤MA − 1}
X (k)A = {xA | MA − 1− 2k+2 < |xA| ≤MA − 1− 2k+1}
for k = 1, . . . ,mA − 2, and
X (k)A = ∅ for k = mA − 1,mA
For Bob’s constellation, we define
X (0)B = {xB | MB − 5 < |xB | ≤MB − 1}
X (k)B = {xB | MB − 1− 2k+2 < |xB | ≤MB − 1− 2k+1}
for k = 1, . . . ,mA − 1, and
X (mA)B = {xB | |xB | ≤MB − 2MA − 1}
Proposition 5: The subsets X (k)A and X (k)B satisfy
s(xA) ≥ k for all xA ∈ X (k)A (32)
s(xB) ≥ k for all xB ∈ X (k)B (33)
and their cardinalities are given by
|X (k)A | = 2k+1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ mA − 2 (34)
and
|X (k)B | =
ß
2k+1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ mA − 1
MB − 2MA if k = mA (35)
Proof: This is a straightforward but lengthy application
of the formulas for s(xA) and s(xB) given in Proposition 4.
